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IN  THE MID-1980s,  when the dollar  declined from its record highs, ob- 
servers  impatiently  waited  for the U.S. trade  balance  to respond.  In the 
short run, instead  of improving,  the deficit continued  to erode. Among 
economists, this sparked  considerable  research  of both  an empirical  and 
theoretical nature. The empirical research appeared to uncover im- 
portant  differences  in the behavior  of U.S. and  foreign  firms  that  helped 
explain  the sluggish  response  of the U.S. trade  balance.  U.S. exporters, 
it appeared,  fixed  their  export  prices  in dollar  terms  and  fully passed the 
exchange  rate  effects through  into their  foreign  currency  prices;  indeed, 
as figure 1 shows, between 1985  and 1989  the U.S. export price index 
compiled  by the Bureau  of Labor Statistics (BLS) moved precisely in 
line with the domestic  wholesale price  index.  ' As Paul  R. Krugman  and 
Richard  E. Baldwin  observe, this implied  that measured  in dollars,  any 
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1. While  this statement  holds  on average,  some studies  using  disaggregated  data  indi- 
cate that  in some industries,  U.S. firms  do not fully pass exchange  rate  changes  through 
into  export  prices.  For example,  see Hooper  and  Mann  (1989),  Marston  (1991),  and  Knet- 
ter  (1993). 
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Figure 1.  U.S.  Export Prices and Domestic Prices,  198S090a 
Index,  1980  =  100 
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Source:  Lawrence  (1990a, table 5, p. 354). 
a.  Prices  were  constructed  by  the  authors and exclude  agricultural and computer  products.  For details  of  how 
these  indexes  were constructed,  see  Lawrence  (1990a, pp. 351-53). 
rise  in U.S. export  values  rested  heavily  on the demand  responses  of for- 
eign buyers-a  response  that  history  suggested  could take time.2 
Foreign  producers  selling  in the United  States, however, appeared  to 
behave  differently.  In particular,  Japanese  and  German  firms  competing 
in U.S. markets stabilized their dollar prices and allowed their profit 
margins  to shrink  in an attempt  to maintain  U.S. market  share. While 
this behavior  helped dampen  the J-curve effect that comes from higher 
import prices, some economists argued that it stifled the adjustment 
process.3 
The passage of time and subsequent research demonstrated  that 
these misgivings  about the trade adjustment  process were misplaced.4 
The response of trade  flows to the dollar  was both substantial  and pre- 
dictable on the basis of traditional  econometric specifications, but it 
took far  longer  than  many  observers  had  anticipated. 
Nonetheless, the debate  about U.S. adjustment  stimulated  some im- 
portant  theoretical  research. A basic theoretical  model would predict 
2.  Krugman and Baldwin (1987). 
3.  See Hooper and Mann (1989) and Krugman and Baldwin (1987). 
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full pass-through  when firms  price by applying  constant markups  over 
marginal  cost. However, the phenomenon  of incomplete  pass-through, 
due to "pricing  to market,"  also received considerable  attention.'  Pric- 
ing to market  refers  to the behavior  of exporters,  who, in an attempt  to 
maintain  their  foreign  currency  prices  at an optimal  level, absorb  at least 
some portion  of changes  in the exchange  rate in their  profit  margins.  In 
general,  they will take rising  profit  margins  on their  foreign  sales when 
the exchange rate depreciates  and falling profit  margins  when the ex- 
change rate appreciates.6  Importantly,  changes in the foreign market 
prices of these firms  will deviate from changes in their home country 
prices in a direction  that is consistent with being sensitive to local mar- 
ket conditions  and  the prices offered  by competitors.7 
Recent research  has suggested several reasons why firms  might  not 
fully pass through  exchange  rate changes  into prices if they had market 
power. Kenneth A. Froot, Paul D. Klemperer,  and Kenneth Kasa fo- 
cused on the role of market  share and demand  dynamics;  Avinash K. 
Dixit and Richard  Baldwin highlighted  the importance  of sunk costs, 
supply side  dynamics, and hysteresis; Rudiger Dornbusch, Peter 
Hooper,  Catherine  L. Mann,  Michael  M. Knetter,  and  Paul  R. Krugman 
emphasized  the long-term  value-maximizing  strategic  behavior  of firms 
in oligopolistic  markets;  and Richard  C. Marston  focused on the defen- 
sive responses of firms to temporary "misalignments"  of exchange 
rates.8 
But the very plausibility  of these theoretical  demonstrations  of the 
optimality  of pricing-to-market  behavior  shifted  the nature  of the puzzle 
and raised an important  question. Why was the behavior  of U.S. firms 
apparently  so different  from that of their foreign counterparts?  These 
theories  suggested  that  firms  competing  in oligopolistic  markets-where 
market  shares  matter  and reentry  (sunk)  costs are high-would  tend to 
cushion local currency  prices from fully reflecting  changes in the ex- 
change  rate, at least in the short run. Yet, even though  U.S. manufac- 
tured  exports are heavily concentrated  in precisely those product  areas 
5. Krugman  (1987). 
6. Feenstra  (1989,  p. 29). 
7. Marston(1991). 
8. Froot and Klemperer  (1989) and Kasa (1992);  Dixit (1989)  and Baldwin  (1988); 
Dornbusch  (1987),  Hooper  and Mann  (1989), Knetter  (1989),  and Krugman  (1987);  and 
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in which oligopolistic  pricing  practices  ought  to dominate,  U.S. export- 
ers appeared  to pass exchange rate changes through  into their export 
prices in an almost  mechanical  fashion. 
What  could explain the observed pricing  behavior  of U.S. firms?  In 
the export pricing literature,  four lines of explanation  have been ad- 
vanced  for their  apparently  unique  pass-through  behavior. 
MYOPIA.  The first  is that managers  of U.S. firms  are inward-looking 
and  simply  do not care  about  foreign  sales; their  pricing  behavior  reflects 
a "take  it or leave it"  attitude.  But this view is hard  to reconcile  with the 
major  interest  U.S. firms  have displayed  in foreign  markets,  as shown  in 
their  direct  foreign  investment  behavior.  An alternative  reason  given for 
myopia  is that  U.S. firms  have high  discount  rates  and  are  thus  unwilling 
to see their  profit  margins  erode.9  But this view could not explain why 
U.S. firms  did not raise their  profit  margins  when the dollar  declined. 
MENU  COSTS.  A second view maintains  that  U.S. firms  do not price- 
discriminate  across markets  because such policies are too costly to ad- 
minister.  After all, exports account for only a small portion  of overall 
sales.  10  For example, the Fortune  list of the fifty largest  U.S. exporters 
in 1990  showed  only eleven firms  for whom  exports  exceeded 20 percent 
of sales.  " But the menu  cost explanation  also appears  to be implausible. 
Firms should behave optimally  on all their sales. The relevant  issue is 
not whether  exports  are small  compared  to domestic sales, but whether 
they are sufficiently  large  to justify the additional  cost of administering 
strategic  pricing  policies. Because U.S. exports of manufactured  goods 
are concentrated  among  a few large  firms  and-in  the aggregate-actu- 
ally exceed those of Japan  in dollar  value, this argument  surely  does not 
stand  up to scrutiny. 
ARBITRAGE.  A third  explanation  rests on the recognition  that  pricing 
to market  implies  a divergence  in changes in a firm's  prices internation- 
ally, and thus an ability to segment markets  without fear of arbitrage. 
Proponents  of this explanation  argue  that  U.S. firms  face a higher  degree 
of pressure  from  arbitrageurs  than  do their  Japanese  or German  counter- 
parts and are therefore less able-or  perhaps even unable-to  price- 
9.  Ohno  (1990). 
10. See Hooper  and  Mann  (1989);  Knetter  (1989);  and  Lawrence  (1990b). 
11. James  Beeler,"Exports:  Ship 'Em Out,"  Fortune,  Spring/Summer,  1991,  Special 
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discriminate  across markets.12 But arbitrage  possibilities  should surely 
run in both directions. If the United States is so open that Americans 
cannot  price-discriminate  abroad-so  that  price  deviations  between, for 
example,  the United  States and  Germany  for U.S. products  will be arbi- 
traged  away-why  does the process not work in reverse for German 
goods sold in the United States? 
DATA  PROBLEMS.  A fourth explanation is that the price data on 
which these findings  are based are themselves questionable.13 This ex- 
planation  raises the possibility  that U.S. firms  did price  to market,  even 
though  the official  data suggested  that exchange rate movements were 
largely  passed through  to prices. Domestic and export prices are col- 
lected by the BLS through  similar  mail surveys. Indeed, in many re- 
sponding  companies,  the same department  is responsible  for answering 
both surveys. In an early study of export price behavior, Irving B. 
Kravis  and  Robert  E. Lipsey found  that  firms  were reluctant  to provide 
different  export and domestic prices for the same products,  apparently 
in fear of accusations  of price discrimination.  14 While  other  researchers 
have ignored  this  argument,  we believe it should  be taken  more  seriously 
than  it has.  15 
To sort through  alternative  explanations,  we decided to violate the 
norms  of our profession  by actually  asking  firms  what they do. We ap- 
pended  a set of questions  on pricing  behavior  to a survey  of the exchange 
rate  responses  of twenty-five  major  U.S. companies  conducted  by Don- 
ald R. Lessard and Srilata  A. Zaheer  of the Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology.  16  In addition,  we conducted  detailed  interviews  with senior 
executives responsible  for pricing  in three major  U.S. exporting  firms. 
The responses we obtained  indicated  behavior  that was more like the 
pricing-to-market  behavior that one might expect in theory than the 
complete  pass-through  behavior  reflected  in the BLS export  price  index. 
Specifically,  the survey concentrated  on respondents'  behavior  in the 
12. See Marston  (1991). 
13. See Lipsey, Molinari,  and  Kravis  (1991)  and  Lipsey  (1993). 
14. Kravis  and  Lipsey  (1971). 
15. In fact, the BLS export  price  index, which  is based  on the unweighted  responses 
of more  than  2,000  firms,  probably  gives a disproportionate  weight  to small  firms  that  are 
subject  to "menu  costs"  and  likely  to charge  their  foreign  buyers  their  U.S. dollar  prices. 
16. Lessard  and  Zaheer's  unpublished  survey  entitled  "Corporate  Responses  to Vola- 
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face of the major  40 percent  effective real  depreciation  of the dollar  from 
1985  to 1989.  Eighty  percent  of the firms  surveyed  said  that  their  pricing 
decisions were made in the local market.  Depending  on the geographic 
region in which the firm  operated, between half and two-thirds  of the 
firms  indicated  that  they had  "kept  local currency  prices  constant"  in the 
face of the precipitous  decline of the dollar  between 1985  and 1989.17 
How can one reconcile  the empirical  findings  that  exchange  rates are 
almost  fully  passed through  into export  prices  with  both  theoretical  con- 
siderations  that U.S. firms  should  price to market  and survey and case 
study evidence that they do price to market?  The key to resolving  this 
apparent  contradiction  lies in the last explanation  offered above: data 
problems.  In particular,  in an important  number  of cases, official  U.S. 
export  prices  do not actually  indicate  the prices  paid  byfinal purchasers 
of U.S. products abroad. In our view, for a significant  proportion  of 
U.S. exports-particularly those that  take the form  of intrafirm  trade- 
export price changes are more likely to reflect changes in the internal 
prices  at which  products  are  transferred  between  headquarters  and  their 
affiliates.  Moreover, we believe that export prices will reflect transfer 
prices, not only for most of the approximately  40 percent of manufac- 
tured  exports that  are shipped  overseas intrafirm,  but also-because  of 
sampling  practices-for a significant  fraction  of the 40 percent  of manu- 
factured exports that are exported at arms length by U.S.  multina- 
tionals. 
In this paper, we will examine the pricing  and sourcing  behavior  of 
U.S.  multinationals  in response to the exchange rate changes in the 
1980s,  with emphasis  on the post-  1985  period  of dollar  depreciation.  We 
will first  present evidence that supports  our two-stage  interpretation  of 
the pricing  practices of these firms. We will then show that, as theory 
would predict, U.S.  multinationals  located abroad do not fully pass 
through  exchange rate changes into their final  product  prices, and that 
they alter their profit margins  in a manner  consistent with pricing-to- 
market  behavior. On the basis of this finding,  we conclude that studies 
17. Anecdotal  evidence also suggests  that U.S. firms  do not pass through  exchange 
rate  changes  in the way the export  price  data  suggest.  See for example,  Ferdinand  Protz- 
man, "Why  Lower Dollar Didn't Work,"  New York  Times, December 1, 1992, p. Dl, 
which  argues  that  "U.S. exports  didn't  get cheaper  and  imports  dearer."  See also Andrew 
Pollack, "In Yen Windfall,  U.S. Companies  Prefer  Profits,"  New York  Times, May 5, 
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that  have relied  solely on BLS export  prices  or unit  values  as proxies  for 
final  purchase  prices have been misled. We will also present evidence 
suggesting  that  the sourcing  decisions  of U.S. multinationals  are  respon- 
sive to changes  in relative  costs. Indeed, in response to the dollar's  de- 
cline after 1985,  intrafirm  exports  responded  by as much  as arms-length 
exports in the same industry. Because export prices (and wholesale 
prices) provide  reasonable  proxies for these relative costs, economists 
who have used these series in explaining  trade  flows have actually  been 
(almost)  right,  albeit  for the wrong  reasons. 
The BLS Export Price Index and Intrafirm Trade 
In principle,  it would not be surprising  to see that, in a multinational 
corporation,  exports will be priced differently  for internal  distribution 
and external sales purposes. Theory suggests, for example, that a dis- 
criminating  monopolist  will set prices to differentiate  the markup  over 
marginal  cost according  to demand  conditions  in different  market  seg- 
ments. On the other  hand,  theory  also indicates  that  if a firm  can source 
its product  from  a variety  of locations, it should  ensure  that  the marginal 
cost of sourcing  from  each location  is equalized.  These theoretical  con- 
siderations suggest that both pricing and sourcing decisions will be 
based  on measures  of marginal  cost, but  that  internal  and  external  prices 
of exports may differ. 
Firms  could implement  their  strategies  on a centralized  or decentral- 
ized basis. In principle,  corporate  headquarters  could dictate  all pricing 
and  sourcing  decisions. Alternatively,  the firm  could  rely on a decentral- 
ized internal  market  in which intermediate  products  are made  available 
to various  subsidiaries  at a price  that  reflects  marginal  costs. The subsid- 
iaries could then make independent  pricing  decisions in their sales (to 
final  purchasers),  as well as independent  sourcing  decisions. Both the 
centralized  and decentralized  approach  should lead to the same out- 
come, and  it is likely that  firms  using  each strategy  can be found. 
Does the BLS export  price  index capture  external  or internal  prices? 
The BLS believes its index reflects  the external  price. BLS official  Wil- 
liam Alterman  describes the export price index as representing  "what 
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point of the average  foreign buyer or seller."  18 Further,  the literature 
testing  U.S. pricing-to-market  behavior  typically  assumes this to be the 
case. However, we disagree,  particularly  when it comes to intrafirm  ex- 
ports. 
Consider  figure  2, which plots changes between 1985  and 1989  in the 
ratio  of U.S. export  prices to producer  prices for a number  of manufac- 
turing  industries against the share of U.S.  multinational  exports ac- 
counted for by intrafirm  trade. A striking  relationship  emerges. The 
higher  the share accounted  for by intrafirm  trade, the more closely ex- 
port  price  changes  match  domestic  price  changes.  If the BLS were really 
capturing  prices to final  purchasers,  this relationship  would not be ex- 
pected. Indeed, intrafirm  trade  is concentrated  in the more  oligopolistic 
sectors, where pricing-to-market  practices could be expected to domi- 
nate. The figure  also indicates  that in industries  in which a higher  share 
of U.S. multinational  exports are sold at arm's  length,  prices tend to re- 
flect local market  conditions;  measured  in U.S. dollars,  relative  export 
prices rose in response to the exchange rate. In contrast, almost no 
change  is apparent  in the relative export prices of goods sold in indus- 
tries  with larger  shares  of intrafirm  trade;  their  prices apparently  moved 
in line with domestic  producer  prices. 
There are four reasons why we think export prices and domestic 
prices move together  in industries  with a high share  of multinational  in- 
trafirm  trade: 
EFFICIENCY.  If pricing  decisions are decentralized,  the export  price 
that  is likely to be used by the U.S. firm  will be a cost-plus version that 
serves as a marginal  cost proxy for firm  allocation  decisions.  19 
TAX  REGULATION.  When  transfer  pricing  practices  are monitored, 
the price  at which arm's-length  sales are made  in the United States gen- 
erally  is the measure  most acceptable  to the tax authorities  in source  and 
destination  nations. 
ADMINISTRATIVE  CONVENIENCE.  Because the pricing  report  to the 
BLS comes from  the U.S. parent,  it will be easier  to report  the domestic 
wholesale  price  than  the price  actually  paid  by the foreign  buyer,  partic- 
ularly if the foreign subsidiary  has some pricing  authority.  Moreover, 
18. Alterman  (1991,  p. 128). 
19. See Hirshleifer  (1956);  Eden (1985);  Diewert (1985);  and Benke and Edwards 
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Figure 2.  Change in Real U.S.  Export Prices and Share of Intrafirm Trade 
for Manufacturing Industries 
Percent change in real U.S.  dollar export prices,  1985-89a 
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Source:  lntrafirm share data are from  U.S.  Bureau of  Economic  Analysis  (1991,  Preliminary Results,  table  85, 
columns  6 and  14) and  U.S.  Bureau of  Economic  Analysis  (1991, table 57, columns  I and 4).  Producer  prices  are 
from  U.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics,  Monithly Labor  Reviewz (January  1991, table 36.  p.  108). Export  prices  are 
from  an  unpublished  series  from  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  entitled  "U.S.  Dollar  Export  Price  Index, 
Average  Exchange  Rates,  and Foreign Currency Price Indexes-nominal  (1985=  100)." 
a.  U.S.  export prices are deflated using sectoral  producer price indexes. 
BLS policy dictates  that  "if  it is determined  that  the buyer  and  the seller 
are  affiliated  and  that  the transaction  price  for the product  does not mir- 
ror  market  trends,"  then the price  data  will not be collected.20  However, 
the market  trends  that are readily  available  to the person filling  out the 
BLS report  in the United States are  more  likely to be the U.S. wholesale 
20. Alterman  (1991,  p. 137).  Emphasis  added. 350  Br-ookings  Paper-s  on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
or list prices  than  the prices paid  by the unaffiliated  foreign  buyer  to the 
affiliated  seller  in a foreign  country.2' 
TARIFFS.  In the face of a currency  depreciation,  firms  have an incen- 
tive to save on ad valorem  taxes and  use the lower foreign  equivalent  of 
the U.S.  price rather than the higher foreign transaction  price. (Of 
course, in the case of an appreciation,  they would prefer the foreign 
price.)22 
The first two of these explanations, efficiency and tax regulation, 
apply particularly  to the intrafirm  trade of multinationals,  while the 
other  two considerations,  administrative  convenience  and  duties, apply 
to all exports. Figure  2 suggests  that  the first  two explanations  are more 
important;  changes  in the price measures  reported  to the BLS by firms 
with a substantial  share of intrafirm  trade are more likely to reflect 
changes in the marginal  cost of sourcing  in the United States than the 
prices paid by the average  foreign  buyer. Moreover, once firms  are re- 
porting  such prices as representative  of their intrafirm  trade, they are 
unlikely  to report  a different  price for their trade  in the same products 
that  are sold to other  locations  at arm's  length. 
If we are  correct,  does this mean  that  the export  price  data  are  wrong? 
Not necessarily. In fact, both the internal  and external  prices are rele- 
vant to the firms' adjustment  process. Given constant marginal  costs, 
the external price is relevant  for adjustments  along the demand  curves 
of final  purchasers;  the internal price is relevant  for adjustments  along 
the derived  demand  curve  for exported  inputs  used in affiliate  sourcing. 
Therefore,  the full adjustment  to an exchange  rate  change  by a multina- 
tional  company  will reflect  both  types of movements.  Moreover,  if firms 
do report  changes  in their  domestic  wholesale  price, they are  likely  to be 
giving  a fairly accurate  picture  of changes in their marginal  costs. As a 
first  approximation,  if the product  contains  no imported  inputs  and  mar- 
ginal cost is constant, the dollar marginal  cost of a product will not 
change  in response  to the exchange  rate. If, however, marginal  costs do 
change, either because of changes in input prices or changes in quan- 
tities produced  where supply  is not infinitely  elastic, changes  in the mar- 
ginal  cost will resemble  those of changes  in the domestic  price. Indeed, 
if the domestic  price is a constant  markup  over marginal  costs, changes 
21.  See Lipsey (1993). 
22.  See Horst (1971) and Feenstra (1989). Subramanian Rangan  and Robert Z. Lawrence  351 
in domestic prices will give an accurate  picture  of changes in marginal 
cost, even though  the levels will differ.  Accordingly,  changes  in the do- 
mestic  wholesale  price  will generally  be a useful  proxy  for  changes  in the 
marginal  cost relevant  for intrafirm  sourcing  decisions. 
U.S. Trade and Multinational  Activity 
In the United States, exporting  of manufactured  products  is heavily 
concentrated  in a relatively  small  number  of large, multinational  firms. 
In 1990,  America's  top fifty  exporters,  all multinationals,  accounted  for 
roughly  40 percent  of U.S. manufacturing  exports.23  For the same year, 
the Compustat  database  indicates  that while large manufacturing  firms 
(those with sales exceeding $500  million)  accounted  for only 20 percent 
of the more than 1,000 U.S.  exporters in the database, these large 
firms accounted for 93.2 percent of the total exports of all reporting 
firms.24  Similarly,  Commerce  Department  data indicate that the U.S. 
parents  of multinational  enterprises  accounted for 82 percent of U.S. 
manufacturing  exports in 1989.25  Breaking  down the export data in an- 
other dimension, intrafirm  trade accounted for 38.6 percent of U.S. 
manufactured  exports  in 1989.26  As figure  3 shows, if aircraft  exports  (al- 
most all of which are made at arm's length)  are excluded, then the in- 
trafirm  share  in U.S. manufactured  exports  jumps  to 43.3 percent.  More 
than three-quarters  of these intrafirm  exports were by U.S. parents  to 
their majority-owned  foreign  affiliates,  with the balance  going between 
U.S. affiliates  and their  foreign  parents.  In general,  U.S. multinationals 
ship about  half  their  exports intrafirm  to their  own affiliates  abroad.27 
23. James  Beeler, "Exports:  Ship 'Em Out,"  Fortune, Spring/Summer  1991,  Special 
Issue, p. 59; U.S. Bureau  of Census  and  U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1992,  table  5). 
24. Standard  and  Poors, Compustat  database,  February  1992. 
25. U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (1991,  Preliminary  Results,  table  85, column  1) 
and  U.S. Bureau  of Census  and  U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1992,  table  5). 
26. See Rangan  (forthcoming).  As Catherine  Mann  pointed  out to us, for purposes  of 
evaluating  the foreign-market  pricing  responses  of U.S. firms,  even this number  may be 
an underestimate.  She notes that an increasing  proportion  of U.S. exports will make a 
roundtrip  to the United  States  because  they  are  sent  abroad  by U.S. firms  to foreign  enter- 
prises  that  assemble  or add  value  to the exported  products  and  then  ship  them  back  to the 
U.S. firm.  In such instances,  Mann  notes, the U.S. firm  has little incentive  to price such 
"exports"  strategically. 
27. U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (1991,  Preliminary  Results, table  85, columns 
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Figure 3. Intrafirm Manufacturing Exports of U.S.  Multinationals, 1989a 
Total shipped by 
Total U.S.  Total shipped  all U.S. parents 
manufacturing  Total intrafirm  by U.S. parents  to affiliates 
exports  exports  in manufacturing  in manufacturing 
($238.6 billion)  ($103.3 billion)  ($78.4 billion)  ($57.6 billionb) 
U.S. affiliates to  /  To wholesae  /  For  resale  and  other 
foreign parents  /  owhleal 
17.8% 
Exported  24.1%  ,  ~  affiliates  / 
armns-length  30.0%  / 
by all entities 
56.7% 
U.S. parents  inFofuhe 
8  +  /  :  to thei  manufacturing  For 
further^ 
I  manufacturing  ~~To  manufacture  to their  manufacturing82% 
Exported  majority-owned  affiliates822 
Exported  foreign affiliates  70.0%  intrafirm  by  75.9%70% 
multinationals  . 
43.3% 
Source:  U.S.  manufacturing export  data are from  U.S.  Bureau of  Census  and  U.S.  Bureau of  Labor  Statistics 
(1992,  table  5).  Intrafirm data  are from  U.S.  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1991,  table  85,  column  6;  table  71, 
columns  6-9)  and U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  (1991), table G-1, columns  1, 2, and 4). 
a.  Excludes  aircraft. 
b.  This  number includes  exports  shipped  by  nonmanufacturing parents to  manufacturing affiliates  and is  hence 
larger than implied in the box to the left. 
Although  multinationals  loom large in U.S. exports, exports do not 
play a large role in the overall foreign sales of U.S. multinationals.  In 
1989, arm's-length  exports accounted for only 22 percent of the total 
sales that  U.S. multinationals  in manufacturing  made  to unaffiliated  for- 
eign customers.28  This indicates  that  it is not exports  but  foreign  affiliate 
production  and sales that are the central channel through  which U.S. 
firms  reach their foreign customers and compete internationally.  Fur- 
thermore,  for products  that are made and sold by the foreign  manufac- 
turing  affiliates  of U.S. parents,  the level of U.S. content  (that  is, inputs 
sourced in  the  United States) is  quite low,  averaging around 20 
percent.29 
For our  purposes,  these data  demonstrate  two key points. First, ana- 
lysts investigating  U.S. export behavior  ignore, at their peril, the role 
28. U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (1991,  Preliminary  Results,  table  85, columns 
S and 13;  table  41, column  9). 
29. Authors'  estimates  from U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (1988,  table 28, col- 
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of multinationals  in general  and intrafirm  exports in particular.  Second, 
discussions about the behavior of "U.S.  firms" should be clear on 
whether  they refer to U.S.-based firms  or U.S.-owned firms.  A signifi- 
cant share of U.S. exports is ultimately  priced and sold not by firms 
located in the United States but by their foreign  affiliates.  U.S. export 
prices, therefore,  may not be the most appropriate  data to answer the 
question  of whether  the goods sold abroad  by U.S.-owned firms  to final 
purchasers  are  priced  to market.  To answer  this question,  we must  move 
beyond an examination  of U.S. export prices to a "direct"  examination 
of the second-stage  external prices that arm's-length  foreign  customers 
are charged by U.S.  firms' foreign affiliates. We do this in the next 
section. 
Do U.S. Multinationals  Price to Market? 
U.S. multinationals  are concentrated  in oligopolistic, high-technol- 
ogy industries, including  chemicals, machinery,  and scientific instru- 
ments. In these industries,  U.S. firms  have considerable  market  power, 
arising  both from their technological superiority  and their large size. 
Under such circumstances,  standard  price theory for monopolists  indi- 
cates that  firms  will set their  prices so that  the markup  they charge  over 
marginal  cost will be inversely related  to the price elasticity of demand 
they face.30  If this elasticity is constant, the markup  will remain  con- 
stant, and  prices and  marginal  costs will change  proportionately. 
For ease of exposition, consider  the case of a U.S. multinational  that 
is a monopolist  in its market  abroad. Assume that it faces an inverse 
demand  function,  P = flQ), and  a cost function,  C(Q)e + C*(Q),  where 
P is the price in foreign currency  terms, Q is the quantity  sold abroad, 
C is the cost incurred  in the United States (in dollars), e is the nominal 
exchange  rate defined  as foreign  currency  units per U.S. dollar,  and C* 
is the cost in foreign  currency  terms  incurred  in the foreign  country.  The 
firm  will set prices so as to maximize  its profits,  which can be written  as 
(1)  '  = P(Q)Q  -  C(Q)e -  C*(Q). 
The standard  first-order  condition  for this firm  can be written  as 
(2)  P  =  [q/(-q +  1)] [C'e  +  C*'], 
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where  -q  is the price  elasticity, and  the cost terms  represent  the marginal 
cost incurred  in the U.S. and abroad  respectively in foreign currency 
terms. If the marginal  costs facing the monopolist  are constant  (that  is, 
C", C*"  =  0), 
(3)  AiP =  AX(C'e +  C*') +  X C'Ae, 
where X  is the monopolist's  markup  over marginal  costs and is equal to 
qI/(-q  +  1). 
From equation 2, the firm's price-cost  margin, PCM  =  [P -  (C'e  + 
C*')]IP,  can be expressed  as 
(4)  PCM  =  1/--q. 
Standard  oligopoly theory will lead to an analogous  result in which in- 
dustry  concentration  and conjectural  variations  about the responses of 
other  firms  will also enter  on the right-hand  side.3'  From  equation  4, the 
percent  change  in the price-cost  margin,  PCM, can be expressed as 
(5)  PCM  =  a-qI- q. 
Equation  5 says that changes in the monopolist's  price-cost margin 
are  a function  of changes  in the elasticity  of demand.  In this static  model, 
if the demand  elasticity is constant so that aq = 0, then the monopolist 
will not change  his price-cost  margin  regardless  of changes  in exchange 
rates  or marginal  costs. By definition  then, the monopolist  will  fully pass 
through  changes  in these variables  to foreign  prices. 
The same result can be obtained  in another  way from equation  3. If 
q is constant, then AP/Ae,  the pass-through  rate with respect to the ex- 
change rate, will be a constant  equal  to XC',  and the pass-through  elas- 
ticity with respect to the exchange  rate  change  will equal  XC'eIP, which 
equals the U.S. share  in the total value added. If all value added were 
done in the United States, or if this elasticity  were measured  on a value- 
added share weighted basis, then the pass-through  elasticity would be 
one, signifying  full pass-through. 
In the "normal"  case of a linear  demand  curve, however, demand  be- 
comes more elastic as price rises. When costs fall, the changes will be 
reflected in lower prices; but, because demand  becomes less elastic, 
firms  raise their markups  and thus prices fall proportionately  less than 
31.  See Waterson (1984, pp. 19-20). Subramanian Rangan  and Robert Z. Lawrence  355 
costs.32  The converse applies  for rising  costs and  prices. In general,  oli- 
gopolistic  exporters  would  experience  rising  profit  margins  when the ex- 
change rate depreciates  and falling profit  margins  when the exchange 
rate appreciates.  When such behavior is destination-specific-leading 
to a divergence  between changes  in prices at home and  abroad-then in 
Krugman's  words, the firm  is "pricing  to market.  " 33  As we noted  above, 
such behavior  appears  to be a feature  of foreign  exporters. 
These considerations  normally  lead to a testing framework  using a 
cost-plus  markup  specification.34  If we were to follow the tradition  of the 
existing  literature,  then our approach  for the study of U.S. multination- 
als' foreign  price  behavior  would  be to regress  the final  product  prices of 
these enterprises  on their  U.S. and  foreign  costs as in equation  3. How- 
ever, explicit price data  for the foreign sales of U.S. multinationals  are 
not available.  One  approach  is to estimate  these prices  using  information 
on the volume of sales of U.S. multinationals  abroad.35  An alternative 
approach  is to test the model using the price-cost  margin  specification; 
this is the approach  we will follow here. 
We specify and  estimate  a function  in which  we regress  changes  in the 
price-cost  margin  against  changes  in U.S. exchange  rates  and  costs, and 
foreign  costs and  competitor  prices. We assume 
(6)  APCM  = f(Ae,  AC',  AC*',  AF*), 
where C' is the portion of the marginal  cost incurred  in the United 
States, e is the nominal  exchange rate in dollars  per unit of foreign  cur- 
rency (equal  to lie),  C*' is the portion  of the marginal  cost incurred  in 
the foreign  country,  and  F* is the price  charged  by foreign  competitors. 
We then specify a linearized  version: 
(7)  PCMi,  =  IN  + 1,  6,  + 12PPIitUS  +  13PP  +  It, 
32. Feenstra  (1989,  p. 29), Marston  (1990)  and  Knetter  (1992,  p. 69)  have  indicated  that 
more  convex demand  schedules  are  less plausible. 
33. Krugman  (1987).  Management  scholars  C. K. Prahalad  and Yves L. Doz (1987, 
p. 46) have something  similar  in mind  when  they argue  that  "It  is important  to realize  that 
prices  are constrained  by market  structures,  competitive  rivalry  and  competitors'  strate- 
gic intentions  in a given  market  and  not  just by cost to the firm.. . ." 
34. See Hooper  and  Mann  (1989). 
35. An  exercise  along  these lines  is presented  in Rangan  (forthcoming).  It reaches  con- 
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where i is an industry  subscript,  t is a period subscript,  dots over vari- 
ables indicate  percent  changes, PPI refers to the producer  price index, 
and  wi,  is an error  term.  We assume  that  PPIUs reflects  industry-specific 
U.S.-based marginal  costs, and that PPI*  reflects both foreign-based 
marginal  costs and foreign competitors'  prices. For each industry,  the 
variable  for foreign  producer  prices is a weighted average of producer 
prices in each of the nine major  countries  where U.S. majority-owned 
foreign affiliates  (MOFAs) operate. The weights for each country are 
that country's share in the total sales of the industry.  The nominal  ex- 
change  rate  variable-measured in dollars  per  unit  of foreign  currency- 
is measured in a similar way. For each industry, this variable is a 
weighted average of exchange rates for each of the nine countries. 
Again, the weights for each country  are the country's share  in the total 
sales of the industry.36 
Equation  5 indicates  that  the dependent  variable,  the percent  change 
in PCM, is equal  to the percent  change  in the elasticity  of demand.  Thus 
if the demand  elasticity (and the markup)  were constant, then none of 
the coefficients in equation  7 would differ  from zero. This is what one 
would expect to find according  to the conventional  wisdom that U.S. 
firms  simply  pass through  exchange rate and other costs into their for- 
eign prices. 
However, if in fact U.S. firms  do price to market,  raising  their  price- 
cost margins  when the dollar  depreciates,  one would  expect to find  a sta- 
tistically  significant  positive coefficient  on the exchange  rate (because e 
is measured  in dollars  per  unit  of foreign  currency).  Similarly,  with such 
pricing-to-market  behavior,  higher  U.S. costs would  be associated  with 
a reduction  in price-cost  margins  and  one would  expect a negative  coef- 
ficient on this variable.  By the same logic, higher  foreign  prices would 
raise  price-cost  margins,  leading  to a positive coefficient.37 
36. Country  coverage  is limited  by the fact that the Commerce  Department  reports 
industry  by country  data  for only nine countries:  Australia,  Canada,  France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,  Switzerland,  and the United Kingdom.  Together, they 
accounted  for 74 percent  of the $500 billion  in sales that U.S. majority-owned  foreign 
affiliates  in manufacturing  made  worldwide  in 1989  (U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis, 
1991,  Preliminary  Results,  table  33). 
37. To conserve degrees  of freedom,  equation  7 constrains  the exchange  rate coeffi- 
cient to be the same across all industries.  In fact, firms  in different  manufacturing  indus- 
tries  are  likely  to show different  propensities  to price  to market  depending  on the demand 
curves they face, the importance  of sunk costs, and market  share. See Krugman  (1987) 
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ESTIMATION.  The basic equation was estimated for data on U.S. 
majority-owned  foreign affiliates  in fourteen manufacturing  industries 
from 1983-89.38  Each  observation  is a year-to-year  percent  change  in the 
dependent  and  independent  variables  for each industry.  Price-cost  mar- 
gins for individual  industries  are calculated  under the assumption  that 
marginal  cost is equal  to average  variable  cost for each firm.39  Thus 
(8)  PCMi =  (Salesi  -  COGSi)ISalesi, 
where  COGS  stands  for costs of goods sold and  includes  labor  and  mate- 
rial  costs. Dividing  each term  on the right-hand  side of equation  8 by the 
quantity  sold gives the industry  gross profit  to revenue  ratio, 
(9)  PCMi  =  (Pi  -  AVCi)/Pi, 
where Pi is the price and A  VCi  is the average variable  cost for a given 
industry. 
To show the variation  by industry  in the dependent  variable,  table 1 
displays the estimated 1985  price-cost margins  of U.S. manufacturing 
majority-owned  foreign  affiliates  for a variety of industries.  The price- 
cost margins  in the table  are  well within  the range  that  Ian  Domowitz  and 
his colleages found to be reasonable  under assumptions  of monopoly 
and oligopoly.40  Based on their findings,  most of the margins  in table 1 
are low enough to suggest oligopolistic  market  structures,  except per- 
haps  for drugs,  beverages,  and  printing  and  publishing,  which  have mar- 
gins high  enough  to be consistent with monopolistic  structures. 
Results 
Table  2 reports  estimates  of equation  7 for the overall  period  between 
1983  and 1989,  and separate  estimates  for the periods  of dollar  deprecia- 
tion and appreciation.  In general, the estimated  coefficients  on the ex- 
change rate variable  provide strong support  for the pricing-to-market 
hypothesis  and a rejection  of the full pass-through  view. The estimated 
38. The starting  date  of 1983  was dictated  by the availability  of data. 
39. This assumption  is routinely  made  in the literature  to get around  the lack of data 
on marginal  costs. See Waterson  (1984,  pp. 19-20)  and  Domowitz,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen 
(1987,  pp. 383-5). Recent work  by Domowitz, Hubbard,  and Petersen  (1988,  p. 58) con- 
cludes  that  this  assumption  is empirically  tenable. 
40. Domowitz,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen  (1987). 358  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Table 1.  Price-Cost Margins of Selected Industries for U.S.  Manufacturing Majority- 
Owned Foreign Affiliates, 1985 
Ratio 
Price-cost 
Industry  margin 
Manufacturing  0.22 
Food  and kindred products  0.27 
Beverages  0.42 
Chemicals  and allied products  0.28 
Industrial  chemicals  and synthetics  0.15 
Drugs  0.44 
Primary  and fabricated  metals  0.20 
Machinery,  except electrical  0.31 
Office  and computing  machines  0.37 
Electric  and electronic  equipment  0.19 
Household  appliances  0.28 
Electronic  components  and accessories  0.15 
Motor  vehicles and equipment  0.08 
Tobacco products  0.36 
Lumber  and furniture  0.19 
Printing  and publishing  0.45 
Glass products  0.19 
Instruments  and related  products  0.27 
Source:  Authors' calculations  using U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  (1988, table 28). 
magnitudes  on the exchange rate coefficient  (which range  from 0.31 to 
0.60) appear  plausible  and  these coefficients  are statistically  significant, 
except in the fourth specification. Furthermore,  as might be antici- 
pated,41 the results imply that pass-through  behavior in response to 
changes in the exchange rate is quite similar to that in response to 
changes  in U.S. costs. 
As table 2 shows, the results in the fourth  specification,  the 1983-85 
appreciation  phase, appear  weakest. But  a standard  Chow  test indicates 
that  the coefficients  during  the appreciation  periods  are not significantly 
different  from those in the later depreciation  period.42  Thus, while the 
results  in the fourth  specification  taken alone do not allow one to reject 
the hypothesis that U.S.  firms practiced  full pass-through  during  the 
41. See Knetter  (1992,  p. 68). 
42. The F-test for equality  of coefficients  was conducted  after  pretesting  for equality 
of variances.  See Maddala  (1992,  p. 177).  The null hypothesis  of equality  of coefficients 
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Table 2.  Regressions Explaining Changes in Price-Cost Margins for U.S.  Manufacturing 
Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates, 1983-89a 
Dollar  Dollar  Dollar 
depreci-  depreci-  Entire  appreci-  Entire 
ating,  ating,  period,  ating,  period, 
Independent  variableb  1986-89  1986-89  1983-89  1983-85  1983-89 
Constant  -0.40  0.60  0.57  1.54  -  3.28 
(-0.16)  (0.28)  (0.36)  (0.35)  (-1.17) 
Nominal exchange  ratec  0.44  .  .  .  0.31  0.60  0.54 
(3.17)  (3.42)  (0.94)  (3.54) 
U.S.  producer pricesd  -0.16  . ..  -0.44  -0.51  -  0.49 
(-0.52)  (-1.78)  (-0.99)  (-2.67) 
Exchange  rate/U.S.  . .  .  0.38  ... 
producer prices  (3.47) 
Foreign producer pricesd  0.17  0.26  0.73  1.17  1.64 
(0.31)  (0.51)  (1.83)  (1.76)  (1.93) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.17  0.18  0.10  0.01  0.89 
Number of observations  56  56  98  42  7 
Source:  Authors' regressions  using nominal exchange  rate data from linternitationial  Financial  Statistics  (rf  quotes). 
Data on country  shares  by industry are from  U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  (1989,  Benchmark Survey,  table 
33). U.S.  and foreign industry-specific  producer price change data are estimated  from OECD (various issues). 
a.  The regressions  are based on equation 7 in the text.  The dependent  variable is the percent change in the price- 
cost  margin.  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics.  Manufacturing  industries  included  in  the  regressions 
are: food  and kindred products; chemicals  and allied products;  fabricated  metal products;  machinery  except  elec- 
trical;  electric  and  electronic  products;  motor  vehicles  and  equipment;  tobacco  products;  textile  products  and 
apparel; lumber and furniture; paper and allied products;  printing and publishing; glass  products;  stone,  clay,  and 
related; and instruments and related. 
b.  All independent  variables are expressed  as year-to-year percent changes. 
c.  The nominal exchange  rate is defined as dollars per unit of foreign currency.  Industry-specific  exchange  rates 
are fixed  weight,  average  changes  in nominal exchange  rates  across  the  nine  major countries  (see  text)  that host 
U.S.  majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs).  Country weights for each industry are based on  1989 country shares 
in U.S.  MOFAs'  sales  in that particular industry. 
d.  Producer prices are for the fixed weight  index of manufactured goods,  excluding  computers.  Country weights 
used  for  estimating  changes  in  industry-specific  foreign  producer  prices  are  the  same  as  those  used  above  for 
estimating exchange  rate changes. 
1983-85  period, the results of the Chow test do not allow one to reject 
the hypothesis  that  U.  S. firms  responded  similarly  to the dollar  appreci- 
ation and depreciation.  Moreover, we have convincing  evidence that, 
over the period  as a whole, the hypothesis  of complete  pass-through  can 
be rejected.  Finally, the pass-through  behavior  implied  by these results 
is well within  the range  of that  reported  in the literature  for foreign  firms 
competing  in U.S. markets.43  It appears  that  "U.S. firms"  are not so dif- 
ferent  after  all. 
43. See Alterman  (1991), Hooper and Mann (1989), Marston  (1991), and Moffett 
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Table 3.  Simulating the Pass-through Response of U.S.  Majority-Owned Foreign 
Affiliates to a 10 Percent Decline in the U.S.  Dollara 
Price-cost  margin elasticityb 
0.00  0.31  0.38  0.44  0.54  0.60 
New  price-cost  marginc  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.24 
New  priced  0.98  0.99  0.99  0.99  1.00  1.00 
Percent change in costs  -  2.00  -  2.00  -  2.00  -  2.00  -  2.00  -  2.00 
Percent change in price  -  2.00  -  1.12  -0.91  -  0.74  -  0.45  -  0.27 
Pass-through ratee  1.00  0.56  0.46  0.37  0.22  0.14 
Imputed demand  1.12  1.08  1.08  1.07  1.06  1.05 
elasticityf 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on results from table 3 and U.S.  Bureau of  Economic  Analysis  (1988, table 
28, columns  I and 7, and table 51, column  1). 
a.  Initial U.S.  and foreign costs  in 1985 accounted  for  15.5 and 62.1 percent of total value added. The difference 
of 22.4 percent represented  the initial price-cost  margin. 
b.  These  price-cost  margin elasticities  are based on the regressions  shown  in table 3. 
c.  The new price-cost  margin (PCM) equals (initial PCM)  x  [1.0  +  (0.10  x  PCM elasticity)]. 
d.  The  new  price  equals  (new  costs)/(l.0  -  new  PCM) where  new  costs  equal (initial U.S.  costs  x  0.90)  plus 
initial foreign costs. 
e.  The pass-through rate is the percentage  change in price divided by the percentage change in costs. 
f.  The  imputed  demand  elasticity  is  an assumed  Herfindahl index  value  of  0.25  divided  by  the  new  price-cost 
margin. 
To help  interpret  the results  shown  in table  2, we provide  a simulation 
spreadsheet  in table 3 that takes the coefficients on the exchange rate 
variable from table 2 and uses them to impute exchange rate pass- 
through  ratios. For initial  conditions, we use the 1985  data on the cost 
structure  of U.S. MOFAs, when U.S. costs accounted  for 15.5  percent 
of value added  and  20 percent  of total cost of goods sold. From  equation 
4, it follows that  if U.S. MOFAs  were all monopolies  in their  respective 
foreign  markets,  then an average  price-cost  margin  of 22.4 percent  cor- 
responds  to a demand  elasticity  of 4.46. In the more  realistic  case of oli- 
gopoly, with a Herfindahl  index of 0.25, these data  correspond  to a de- 
mand  elasticity of 1.12  (see table 3). 
The table simulates  the effect of a 10  percent  decline in the U.S. dol- 
lar's exchange rate  on foreign  currency  prices, under  the different  elas- 
ticities of the price-cost margin  estimated  in table 2. Consider  the first 
column in table 3 when the elasticity of the price-cost margin  with re- 
spect to the exchange rate is taken to be zero-a  case representing  the 
extreme form of the conventional  wisdom. In this case, the PCM will 
remain  unchanged. Hence, given a 20 percent share in total costs of 
goods sold, the 10 percent  fall in the dollar  lowers total costs of goods 
sold by 2 percent. With  the markup  unchanged,  prices also fall by 2 per- Subramanian Rangan  and Robert Z. Lawrence  361 
cent, giving  a pass-through  rate equal  to unity. Note, however, that  be- 
cause of the small  U.S. share  in total value added, even under  complete 
pass-through,  the foreign  currency  prices charged  by U.S. multination- 
als decline by only 2 percent  in the face of a 10  percent  fall in the value 
of the U.S. dollar. 
Next we simulate  cases in which the PCM  elasticity corresponds  to 
the exchange  rate  coefficients  (from  smallest  to largest)  that  we have es- 
timated  in our  regressions  in table  2. With  a PCM  elasticity  of 0.31 (taken 
from  the third  specification  in table  2), prices  decline  by only 1.12,  rather 
than  2.00 percent  as under  full  pass-through.  This  implies  a pass-through 
rate  of 0.56. With  a PCM  elasticity  of 0.38 (taken  from  the second speci- 
fication  in table 2), prices decline by only 0.91 percent, which implies 
a pass-through  rate of 0.46. In general,  larger  PCM  elasticities result in 
smaller  pass-through  and  larger  increases  in markups. 
The actual  nominal  effective depreciation  of the U.S. dollar  between 
1985  and 1989  was 31 percent. However, as the simulation  in table 3 
shows, even if U.S. firms  had fully passed this through  into their final 
sales prices, on average  their  prices in foreign  markets  would have de- 
clined  by only 6.2 percent. In fact, given the estimated  elasticity  of 0.31 
in the third  specification  in table 2, the average  decline in prices would 
have been only 3.5 percent (0.56 x  6.2 percent). Thus our evidence 
shows why a majority  of major  U.S. exporting  firms  surveyed  indicated 
that they had "maintained"  their foreign currency  prices-even  in the 
face of this major  exchange  rate shift. 
Of course, if U.S.  products were simply distributed  by U.S.  for- 
eign affiliates,  the price declines, although  a small share of total sales, 
would be more conspicuous than if they were intermediate  inputs and 
thus  a small  share  of the value  of each final  product  sold. But, in fact, the 
1989  data  indicate  that  about  82 percent  of the imports  received  by U.S. 
MOFAs in the manufacturing  industry are inputs for further value 
added-which supports  the interpretation  of these products  as interme- 
diate  inputs,  rather  than  final  sales."4 
To summarize,  these results suggest quite strongly  that U.S. firms 
abroad  vary their price-cost margins  in response to changes in the dol- 
lar's  exchange  rate. The estimated  results suggest  pass-through  rates of 
14 to 60 percent. The size of these estimates is consistent with those 
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made  by other  researchers  for foreign  firms  competing  in U.S. markets; 
we can reject  the view that  U.S. firms  fully  pass through  and  do not price 
to market. 
Sourcing Behavior of U.S. Multinationals 
Economists  have long  debated  whether  multinationals  present  an im- 
pediment to the macroeconomic  adjustment  process initiated by ex- 
change rate changes.45  A  central question in this debate has been 
whether  the intrafirm  trade  of multinational  enterprises  responds  in the 
anticipated direction and with the degree of elasticity exhibited by 
arm's-length  trade. 
The literature  offers views on every side of the issue. Some authors 
predict  that  intrafirm  trade  has slow and  small  responses  because activi- 
ties among  firms  reflect  hierarchical  or command  behavior  and  are  not as 
sensitive  to market  considerations  as arms-length  transactions.46  Others 
predict  that  intrafirm  trade  has relatively  large  and  more  rapid  responses 
because multinationals  have ready  access to production  capacity, both 
at home and abroad,  which allows them to respond  effectively to cost 
changes brought  about by exchange rate fluctuations.47  A third view, 
presented  by C. Fred  Bergsten  and  his colleagues, maintains  that  "there 
is no compelling  reason  to believe that  [multinationals]  react  differently" 
to exchange  rate  changes.48 
The large depreciation  of the U.S.  dollar during  the latter half of 
the 1980s  provides a natural  experiment  to test these views. Consider 
table 4. As the first two columns of this table show, the value of U.S. 
intrafirm  manufacturing  exports  grew at rapid  pace of 47 percent  during 
this four-year  period, but this was still less than  the 65 percent  increase 
in overall U.S. manufacturing  exports.49  This comparison  suggests that 
45. See Bergsten,  Horst,  and  Moran  (1978),  especially  chapter  8. 
46. See Goldsbrough  (1981),  Helleiner  (1981,  p. 3), Little  (1986,  p. 46), Cho  (1990),  and 
Encarnation  (1992). 
47. See Knetter  (1992, 1993),  Lipsey and  Kravis  (1986),  Little  (1986, 1987),  and  Mar- 
ston (1991). 
48. Bergsten,  Horst, and  Moran  (1978,  p. 285). 
49. The aircraft  and parts  industry  is excluded  from  this analysis  because there  is al- 
most  no intrafirm  trade  in this  industry,  for  reasons  related  to scale  economies  and  national 
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Table  4. Growth  in Overall  U.S. Manufacturing  Exports  and U.S. Parents'  Intrafirm 
Exports,  1985-89 
Percent 
Inidutstry  shar-e 
Unweighted  change  Iniduistiy  shar-e  of  weighted  chanige  in 
in manuifacturzing  manufaccturinig  manuifacturinig 
exports  expor  ts'  exportsb 
U.S.  U.S. parienits'  U.S.  U.S. parenits' U.S.  U.S. parents' 
Intduistiy  overall  initrafirm overall  initr  afir-m  overall  initr-afilrm 
All manufacturingc  65.4  47.0  100.0  100.0  51.5  50.5 
Food and kindred products  47.4  23.6  6.5  2.1  1.0  0.5 
Tobacco  186.4  139.4  1.3  0.3  0.6  0.4 
Textiles  and apparel  113.6  125.0  2.0  0.3  0.3  0.4 
Lumber and furniture  123.6  91.8  2.7  0.2  0.3  0.2 
Paper and allied products  102.9  294.8  3.1  0.7  0.8  2.2 
Printing and publishing  77.3  21.5  0.9  0.3  0.2  0.1 
Chemicals and allied products  64.4  65.6  15.1  14.0  9.0  9.2 
Rubber products and plastics  60.7  41.6  1.9  1.2  0.7  0.5 
Stone,  clay,  glass,  and concrete  63.7  41.9  1.2  0.5  0.3  0.2 
Primary metals  136.9  54.2  4.2  1.1  1.5  0.6 
Fabricated metals  49.4  43.5  3.8  0.8  0.4  0.3 
Machinery,  except  electrical  45.5  74.1  24.0  26.2  11.9  19.4 
Electrical equipment  78.9  21.0  13.8  10.1  8.0  2.1 
Motor vehicles  and parts  26.7  25.3  10.6  35.4  9.4  8.9 
Instruments and related parts  99.8  84.8  6.8  6.5  6.5  5.5 
Other  168.7  -16.0  2.2  0.3  0.6  -0.1 
Source:  U.S.  export data are from U.S.  Bureau of Census and U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics  (1988, table 5, and 
1992, table 5).  lntrafirm export  data are from  U.S.  Bureau of  Economic  Analysis  (1988, table 57,  column.  4) and 
U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  (1991, table 85, column 6). 
a.  Exports in 1985 and 1989 for a given  manufacturing industry were added together and then divided by the sum 
total of  1985 and 1989 manufacturing exports  in all industries. 
b.  Weights used  are the share of  U.S.  parents'  intrafirm manufacturing exports. 
c.  Excludes  petroleum and transportation equipment other than motor vehicles  and parts. 
intrafirm  exports responded  less to the decline in the dollar  than arms- 
length  exports. These results support  the findings  of Jane Sneddon  Lit- 
tle, who concluded that intrafirm  exports are far less sensitive than 
arm's-length  exports. She found  that  in response  to the dollar  apprecia- 
tion between 1982  and 1984,  intrafirm  exports grew by 27 percent, but 
that the rising dollar held down the growth in arm's-length  exports 
enough  to keep overall manufacturing  export growth  to only 4 percent 
during  this period.50 
factured  exports  would  grow  by 65.6 percent,  while  intrafirm  exports  would  grow  by 47.6 
percent.  These  growth  rates  do not differ  significantly  from  the nonaircraft  export  growth 
rates  presented  in this  paper. 
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However, these simple comparisons need to be interpreted  cau- 
tiously. Responsiveness  to exchange rates can be expected to differ  by 
industry;  therefore,  these comparisons  could capture  changes  in indus- 
try mix, rather  than the impact  of intrafirm  trade  per se. Indeed this is 
the case. As the middle  two columns  of table 4 show, intrafirm  trade  is 
heavily concentrated  in only five two-digit SIC industries:  chemicals 
and allied industries; machinery (except electrical); electrical equip- 
ment and supplies; motor vehicles and parts; and instruments  and re- 
lated  products.  These industries  account  for 92 percent  of U.S. intrafirm 
exports, but only 70 percent  of overall  U.S. manufacturing  exports. 
In fact, at the individual  industry  level, the data in the first two col- 
umns of the table indicate very similar overall and intrafirm  growth 
rates:  64.4 and  65.6 percent  in chemicals;  26.7 and  25.3 percent  in motor 
vehicles;  99.8 and  84.8 percent  in instruments;  and  although  large  differ- 
ences do persist  in the nonelectrical  and  electrical  machinery  industries, 
these differences  do not, on balance, suggest  greater  responsiveness  of 
arm's-length  exports. In nonelectrical  machinery,  arm's-length  exports 
grew much faster. Curiously,  when these two industries  are taken to- 
gether  as one-machinery-overall  and  intrafirm  growth  rates  converge 
at 56.7 and  56.9 percent,  respectively  (not shown  in the table).51  Industry 
mix is accounted for formally in the fifth and sixth columns, which 
weight each industry's growth rate by its share in intrafirm  exports. 
Comparing  the top figures  in each column  shows that  once industry  mix 
is taken  into account,  there  is virtually  no difference  between  the growth 
rates of intrafirm  and arm's-length  exports. Our analysis for the late 
1980s, therefore, lends support  to the views of Bergsten, Horst, and 
Moran,  who argued  that multinational  corporations  do not react differ- 
ently to exchange  rate  changes. 
Earlier  in the paper, we noted two important  features of intrafirm 
trade. First, more than 80 percent of such shipments  are intermediate 
products  used as inputs by overseas affiliates. Second, products  from 
the United States account  for less than  20 percent  of the overall  value  of 
the sales of U. S. overseas affiliates.  We  also provided  evidence that  only 
about  half of the dollar's  depreciation  is passed through  into final  prod- 
51. We hypothesize  that  the apparent  difference  in intrafirm  and  arm's-length  export 
growth  rates in electrical  and nonelectrical  machinery  is due to differences  in classifica- 
tion, not behavior.  For further  elaboration  and some supporting  evidence, see Rangan 
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uct prices. On average, therefore,  a 40 percent reduction  in dollar  mar- 
ginal  costs would  lower foreign  prices by only 4.0 percent  (0.5 x 0.2 x 
40). If U.S. content remained  a fixed share of foreign sales, then we 
would not expect much  of an impact  on U.S. exports operating  through 
this channel. Yet as we have seen, in fact, intrafirm  exports increased 
considerably.  This suggests that much of the adjustment  took the form 
of sourcing  adjustments  by U.S. multinational  corporations.  As we will 
now demonstrate,  U.S. multinationals  raised  the U.S. content of their 
output  in a manner  that  is consistent  with a substitution  response  to the 
weaker  dollar. 
Table  5 reports  data on the operations  of U.S. MOFAs  in the manu- 
facturing  industry  in eighteen countries, which account for nearly 90 
percent of all sales made by U.S. manufacturing  MOFAs  worldwide.52 
The  last column  of data  indicates  that  the level of estimated  U.S. content 
in products  sold by U.S. MOFAs rose between 1985  and 1989  in ten of 
the countries  considered.53  Further,  in Malaysia  and Singapore,  where 
U. S. content  levels did  not rise, the U. S. dollar  appreciated vis-'a-vis  the 
domestic currency. So in two-thirds  of the countries, the substitution 
behavior  of U.S. multinationals  was in keeping with a priori  expecta- 
tions, given movements  in the real  exchange  rate.54 
Figure  4 plots the changes in the U.S. content levels in seventeen of 
these countries  against  the changes in real exchange rates. Rising  U.S. 
content levels covary with falling  values of the dollar. In fact, ordinary 
least squares  regression,  where  E is the U.S. dollar's  real  exchange  rate 
in dollars  per foreign  currency  unit, gives the following  result: 
US content  =  0.27  +  1.25E, 
(4.10)  (-2.78) 
R2 =  0.50; F-test  =  16.82; sample size  =  17 
(t-statistics  in parentheses) 
where  dots over the variables  indicate  percent  changes. 
52. U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (1991,  Preliminary  Results,  table  32, col. 3). 
53. Although  the U.S. content  levels shown  in table  S  may,  in and  of themselves,  merit 
further  exploration  in terms  of what  they signal  about  the strategy  of U.S. multinationals 
in various  countries  (and  possibly  industries),  this issue is not taken  up  here. 
54. Of  the remaining  six countries  where  behavior  did  not match  a priori  expectations, 
three-Hong Kong,  the Philippines,  and  Taiwan-are newly  industrialized  countries.  For 
these countries,  factors  other  than  the exchange  rate  were probably  important,  including 
improvements  in their  productive  competitiveness. 366  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 





dollar  U.S. content in MOFAsa 
real 
exchange  1985 to 
rate,  1989 
Country  1985-89  1985  1989  change 
Canada  17.0  40.6  38.9  -4.2 
Belgium  26.2  12.4  11.7  -5.7 
France  39.9  6.3  6.4  1.8 
Germany  42.9  5.3  6.9  31.8 
Ireland  32.3  24.3  22.3  -  8.4 
Italy  45.0  5.1  6.9  37.1 
Netherlands  43.9  10.0  13.3  31.9 
United  Kingdom  38.3  7.2  8.2  14.9 
Spain  44.1  3.0  11.8  298.9 
Switzerland  42.6  4.9  8.7  77.7 
Japan  41.1  10.5  14.6  38.6 
Australia  34.9  10.1  11.1  10.0 
Hong  Kong  18.0  22.3  15.1  -32.4 
Malaysia  -  10.3  44.8  26.6  -40.6 
Philippines  6.0  21.6  18.5  -  14.4 
Singapore  -4.7  28.8  27.5  -4.3 
South  Korea  22.9  40.0  42.1  5.4 
Taiwan  29.0  17.1  13.8  -  19.2 
Source:  U.S.  exports  to  MOFAs  is  from  U.S.  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1988,  table  52,  column  3;  1989, 
Preliminary Results,  table 68,  column  3).  Export prices  by  sector  are an unpublished  series  from the  U.S.  Bureau 
of Labor Statistics  entitled "U.S.  Export Dollar Price, Average Exchange  Rate, and Foreign Currency Price Indexes 
(1985 =  100)." Period averages  are used for  1989. Industry weights  used  in export  price calculations  are from U.S. 
Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (1991,  table 66).  Cost  of goods  sold  data for  1985 and  1989, respectively,  are from 
U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  (1988, table 27, columns  8 and 10; table 29, column 3; and table 31, column  3). 
Exchange  rate data are from International Financial  Statistics  (rf quotes),  unpublished data from the Federal Reserve 
(for  Taiwan),  and  the  United  Nations  (for Hong  Kong).  Producer prices  are from OECD  (1992:2); World  Bank, 
World Tables; and United Nations  (1991). Producer price index weights are from U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis 
(1987, table 29). 
a.  U.S.  content  level  of  U.S.  MOFAs  in any  particular country  is  measured  by  dividing  the  quantity of  U.S. 
imports that these  MOFAs  make in a given  year by the total cost  of goods  sold in the same year. 
These results  suggest  that, ceteris  paribus,  over this  period,  every 1  per- 
cent drop  in the U.S. dollar's  real  exchange  rate  leads to a 1.25  percent 
rise in the U.S. content level of U.S. manufacturing  MOFAs. This esti- 
mated elasticity coefficient of 1.25 passes the standard  t-test at the 99 
percent  level and, together  with a constant  term, explains  half the total 
variation  in changes in U.S. content levels between 1985  and 1989. A 
similar  regression  that  estimates  the U.S.-to-local content  response-or Subramanian Rangan  and Robert Z. Lawrence  367 
Figure 4.  Change in the Real Exchange Rate and U.S.  Content Levels in Majority- 
owned Foreign Affiliates, 1985-89 
Percent  change in U.S. content  levelsa 
100 
Switzerland  o 
50- 






South Korea - 
0  * France 
Singapore *  Canada- 
Belgium  * Ireland 
Philippines - 
* Taiwan 
Hong Kong - 
Malaysia - 
-50  I  1  1  1  1  I 
-20  -10  0  10  20  30  40  50 
Percent  change in U.S. real exchange rateb 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on table 5 and Rangan (forthcoming). 
a.  The percent change in U.S.  content  levels  from 1985 to  1988 is the percent change in the share of U.S.  content 
in products manufactured by MOFAs of  U.S.  parents. 
b.  The  U.S.  dollar's  real exchange  rate is  denominated  as  U.S.  dollars  per foreign  currency  unit,  so  positive 
percent  changes  from  1985 to  1989 represent  a  real depreciation,  while  negative  changes  represent  a  real dollar 
appreciation. 
the elasticity  of substitution-yields an estimate  of 1.48. 55 This estimate 
is quite  similar  in magnitude  to those found  in conventional  estimates  of 
export  price elasticity.56 
55. See Rangan  (forthcoming). 
56. See Stern,  Francis,  and  Schumacher  (1976,  p. 224).  They  cite Junz  and  Rhomberg 
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A similar  analysis  can be carried  out aggregating  the data  by industry 
rather  than by country. Although  we do not show the results, with the 
exception of U.S.  MOFAs in the transportation  equipment  industry, 
MOFAs in all the other major  industries  responded  quite vigorously  to 
the  depreciation  of the  dollar  by raising  their  U. S. content  levels. MOFAs 
in the more commodity-based  industries,  such as food and metals, ex- 
hibited  a higher  elasticity of substitution  than those in the more differ- 
entiated industries, such as chemicals, nonelectrical  machinery, and 
electric and electronic  equipment.  While  MOFAs in these latter  indus- 
tries responded  with an elasticity of around  one, MOFAs  in the food in- 
dustry  responded  with an elasticity of two, and those in metals with an 
elasticity  ofjust under  two."7 
We should  end  this section  on a note of caution.  Using  the annual  data 
on U.S. multinational  operations  has certain  drawbacks.  First, it is hard 
to distinguish  changes  in the aggregate  that reflect  new entry  and exit of 
firms  from  changes  that  reflect  expansion  of existing  operation.  Second, 
because each firm  is classified  in only one industry,  changes in a firm's 
product  mix can shift  a firm's  classification,  further  complicating  the in- 
terpretation  of the more aggregate  data."8  Nonetheless, the best avail- 
able data do suggest that in the second half of the 1980s,  U.S. multina- 
tionals in most industries  and countries added to the U.S. content of 
their  products  sold abroad. 
57. U.S. MOFAs  in the automobile  industry  did  not respond  to the  large  exchange  rate 
change.  In  fact, what  little  responsiveness  they  showed  appears  to be in the "wrong"  direc- 
tion. That  is, these MOFAs  seem to have  lowered  their  U.S. content  levels between 1985 
and 1989.  The motor  vehicles and  parts  industry  is very special  because  the bulk  of U.S. 
exports  and  investment  in this industry  take  place  under  specific  agreements  with  Canada 
and Mexico. For a recent treatment  of this issue, see Eden and Molot (1992). These 
agreements  constrain  the adjustment  possibilities  of U.S. firms,  particularly  with regard 
to switching  out of local  content.  For  instance,  the U.S. agreement  with  Mexico  stipulates 
that  every $1 of car imports  brought  into the country  by U.S. MOFAs  in Mexico must  be 
matched  by $2 of exports;  the ratio  for  auto  parts  is 1:1  (Hufbauer  and  Schott, 1993,  p. 39). 
Similar  local content rules are imposed  by Canada  stipulating  that for every car sold in 
Canada,  a car  must  be made  in Canada  (Eden  and  Molot, 1992). 
58. If product-mix  changes  accounted  for the increase  in U. S. content  levels, then  the 
industry  mix of U.S. MOFAs  should  have changed  noticeably  between 1985  and 1989  in 
several  countries.  However, for each country,  the Pearson  coefficient  of correlation  be- 
tween industry  mix  in 1985  and 1989  in these countries  was very high  and  often  close to 1, 
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Concluding  Comments 
We have presented  evidence suggesting  that U.S. multinationals  be- 
have in a manner  consistent  with a priori  expectations.  They allow their 
profit  margins  to cushion the effects of exchange rate changes on the 
prices they receive from foreign buyers. In addition,  they adjust  their 
sourcing  in response  to changes  in marginal  costs. 
The study of macroeconomic  relationships  is fraught  with difficulty 
and often requires  ignoring  complex institutional  relationships.  In par- 
ticular,  studies of exchange rate adjustment  rarely  pay attention  to the 
role  of multinational  companies  in the conduct  of trade.  We have argued 
here that the use of the BLS export price index to draw conclusions 
about  market  pricing  behavior  has led to misleading  conclusions about 
how "U.S." firms  price  abroad.  On the other  hand,  changes  in sourcing, 
rather  than a rise in total final sales, appear  to be the major  avenue by 
which the exchange rate affects intrafirm  decisions. Because the BLS 
export  price data provide a reasonable  measure  of changes in the mar- 
ginal  cost of producing  in the United States, they have served  fairly  well 
in tracking  the sourcing  decisions of U.S. multinationals. Comments 
and Discussion 
Richard N. Cooper: The paper by Subramanian  Rangan  and Robert 
Lawrence  basically  makes  two contributions  to a highly  specialized  but 
growing  literature.  The  first  involves some new estimates  concerning  the 
extent to which U.S. firms  pass through  foreign  exchange rate changes 
in their  pricing  to foreigners.  The second finding  concerns  the degree  to 
which exchange  rates influence  sourcing  by U.S. corporations. 
I am  going  to comment  mainly  on the first  finding,  which  is more  con- 
troversial. On the second, Rangan and Lawrence's results are emi- 
nently reasonable,  but basically they are drawn  from one episode, the 
sharp devaluation  of the U.S.  dollar from 1985 to 1988. One always 
ought  to be leery about  generalizing  from  a single  episode, even though 
in this case the results  strike  me as sensible. 
The key to Rangan  and Lawrence's first  finding  is their observation 
that a substantial  fraction of U.S.  international  trade represents in- 
trafirm  trade. Roughly 40 percent of U.S. exports of manufactures  is 
intrafirm  trade,  and  one cannot  infer  from  the price  that  is charged  to the 
downstream  affiliate  of the same firm  what price is actually  charged  to 
foreigners.  Therefore,  one cannot infer  much about U.S. pricing  strat- 
egy to foreigners  from  BLS data, which report  U.S. export  prices. 
I will suggest  some worthwhile  extensions  of Rangan  and  Lawrence's 
analysis, and then some implications  of their results  for how the world 
operates, on the one hand,  and how economists theorize  about  how the 
world  operates, on the other. 
Rangan  and Lawrence  have focused on affiliated  sales, but it would 
be useful also to look at nonaffiliated  sales insofar  as one can separate 
them  from  affiliated  sales. Perhaps  one could do that  on an industry-by- 
industry  basis since the extent of foreign  investment  varies  greatly  from 
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practically  none at all in civil aviation,  for example, to very extensive in 
automobiles. 
Figure  2 is suggestive  on that score, but it is certainly  not definitive. 
One would like to know whether  the charge  that U.S. firms  merely ac- 
cept orders,  while foreign  firms  make  an effort  to sell abroad,  applies  to 
firms  that  do not have downstream  sales to overseas affiliates. 
An analogous  question  concerns imports  into the United States. The 
arguments  the authors  adduce  for intrafirm  sales for U.S. firms  presum- 
ably also apply  to foreign  firms  selling  in this country, and therefore,  in 
principle,  their prices would be subject to the same kinds of biases in 
reporting;  the question is whether that is so. The same data set, basi- 
cally-although  less complete-is  available  for foreign investment in 
this country  as it is for U.S. investment  abroad.  It would be interesting 
to run  this exercise on that  data set. 
Let me express even more skepticism than the authors have ex- 
pressed about the validity  of the data we are using. The generalization 
that  has emerged  from  earlier  work  is that, in contrast  to U. S. firms,  for- 
eign firms  price to market.  That  is to say, during  the 1982-85  dollar  ap- 
preciation, they fattened their margins  on exports substantially,  and 
during  the subsequent  1985-89  dollar  depreciation,  they trimmed  their 
margins  substantially  without  adjusting  their  dollar  prices. 
Yet the share  of imports  of manufactured  goods in U.S. final  sales of 
manufactures  rose sharply  during  the first  half  of the 1980s  and  declined 
during  the second half of the 1980s. That is hardly consistent with a 
pricing-to-market  strategy  unless quality  happened  to rise in the first  pe- 
riod  and  decline in the second. 
I believe the pricing  data  on at least some imports  are highly  suspect, 
and they are suspect in part because nobody actually  knows what the 
unit  prices are, including  the selling  firms.  Let me give an example. It is 
common  practice  in the consumer  electronics  industry  for  foreign  manu- 
facturers  at year-end  to provide  substantial  advertising  and  other  allow- 
ances to  their major customers. Those allowances are negotiated 
between buyer and seller, and they do not get recorded anywhere in 
the transactions  prices, as far as I know. Yet, those rebates can be 
significant. 
What  I suspect happened  in the early 1980s  is that such indirect  dis- 
counts rose substantially,  giving  the appearance  of fattened  margins  by 
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relative importance.  So on an economic basis there was greater  price 
movement  and  less pricing  to market  than  shows up in the statistics. 
Let me turn  to some of the broader  issues raised  by Rangan  and  Law- 
rence's paper. What  is the sensible pricing  strategy  for a firm  that sells 
abroad  as well as domestically in a world of floating  exchange rates? 
Most buyers  and sellers do not like daily changes  in prices, particularly 
for branded  goods. But exchange  rates  change  daily. What  is the appro- 
priate  pricing  strategy  for exporting  firms  under  those circumstances? 
Firms  face a dilemma:  if they maintain  a fixed ex-factory  price  for all 
customers,  customers  in other  currency  areas  will  face daily  fluctuations 
in the prices they face (except insofar  as importers  absorb  the fluctua- 
tions); if they maintain  fixed prices within each market, that implies 
price discrimination  among customers when measured  in terms of the 
ex-factory  price. Customers  generally  do not like fluctuating  prices;  nor 
do they like to be the targets  of discrimination.  Moreover,  national  au- 
thorities  take a dim view of price discrimination,  particularly  when it is 
open to the charge  of "dumping":  that  is, selling  in the importing  country 
at a lower  price  than  prevails  in the home  market.  Both the United  States 
and the European  Community  have become very active in pursuing  al- 
leged dumping,  and other countries have begun to emulate those two 
major  markets. Moreover, U.S. antitrust  authorities  have historically 
been highly  concerned  about  predatory  pricing,  although  rather  less so 
in the 1980s  than  during  other  periods.  Not least, there  is the question  of 
the appropriate  incentives to management  in firms  that, at least in the 
case of the United States, are large  enough  to be concerned  about  inter- 
nal management  of the firm. America's large exporting  firms  are typi- 
cally multidivisional  firms, for instance, and top management  has to 
worry  about  maintaining  discipline  on the numerous  decentralized  deci- 
sionmakers  in each firm. 
So, what is the appropriate  pricing strategy under these circum- 
stances?  From  the point  of view of maximizing  profits,  economists have 
taught for a long time that maximal  price discrimination  is desirable. 
"Divide  up your customers  as well as you can and scoop out the poten- 
tial  consumer  surplus  from  each customer."  That  is not  possible  for most 
firms,  for a variety  of reasons, including  the possibility  of resale. What 
then are their  second-best  strategies? 
One of them  is to invest across currency  areas  so that  the firm  can do 
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do. They can follow one pricing  strategy  for the intrafirm  international 
transactions  and  a quite  different  pricing  strategy  vis-a-vis  their  ultimate 
customers.  The foreign  affiliate  becomes a kind  of shock absorber,  and 
the local knowledge  that  it has regarding  customer  behavior  and  elastic- 
ity of demand  can be utilized  by each of the affiliates.  Overseas invest- 
ment thus might  be a sensible strategy  even when the rate of return  on 
that  investment  is lower than  at home in terms  of normal  capital  theory: 
that  is, in physical  terms. 
A second strategy  would  be to differentiate  the end products  as much 
as possible in order to reduce the possibilities  for arbitrage.  From this 
point of view-provided  it does not take too large a toll in terms of 
costs-having  a metric system in Europe and the English measuring 
system in the United States is not all bad  from the firm's  point of view. 
Having  fifty cycles at 220 volts in Europe  and sixty cycles at 110  volts 
in the United States, or left-hand  drive in Britain  and right-hand  drive 
on the Continent,  is not all bad. Sony was probably  the world's biggest 
beneficiary  of three TV broadcasting  systems because Sony can, at 
small  cost, make  the adjustments  to each of the three systems and have 
quite  different  pricing  strategies  in Europe, United States, and at home 
in Japan. 
A third strategy  is that firms  do whatever they can to prevent arbi- 
trage. Arbitrage  can undermine  any price-discriminating  strategy, and 
it is not an accident  that  in the mid-1980s  a number  of quite  negative  re- 
marks  were made about the emergence of gray markets  in the United 
States. 
What are gray markets?  This funny category of market  was devel- 
oped and  publicized  by a number  of firms,  including  Sony  . Gray  markets 
reflect  arbitrage  taking  place by brokers,  jobbers, and  dealers  outside  of 
traditional  marketing  channels. It may be in a manufacturing  firm's  in- 
terest  to inhibit  that  from  happening.  Michael  Deaver made  headlines  in 
the mid-1980s  by buying German  cars on an official trip to Germany; 
they were much cheaper there because the high-quality  German  cars 
were being priced in dollars  in the United States much  higher  than the 
DM prices converted at market exchange rates: that is, the German 
firms  were engaging  in price discrimination.  Different  safety standards 
permitted  some market  segmentation,  but  a conversion  kit  could  be pur- 
chased  relatively  cheaply. After  a time, arbitrage  began  to take  place, as 
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The most egregious  case of an attempt  to segment  markets  that I am 
aware of is when Duracell brought a trademark  infringement  case 
against  the importation  of Duracell  batteries  from  its wholly  owned Bel- 
gian subsidiary.  U.S. customs dismissed the charge, but Duracell  had 
the gall to appeal  to the Court  of Customs  Appeals. That  court  properly 
also threw  it out. But the episode provides  an example  of how a firm  can 
throw (legal) sand into the process of arbitrage.  That is a sensible cor- 
porate strategy under these circumstances, even if it is not socially 
optimal. 
The foreign  antidumping  laws and the U.S. antitrust  laws must pro- 
vide a substantial  inhibition  to U.S. firms,  especially  to price  discrimina- 
tion. Managers  of large U.S. firms defer to their general counsels on 
such matters, and the general counsels will generally counsel against 
price  discrimination.  The result  is Rangan  and  Lawrence's  pricing  strat- 
egy, under  which a firm  charges  the same price to its own affiliates  and 
allows the affiliates  to charge  the appropriate  prices in foreign  markets. 
In conclusion, let me draw  your attention  again  to figure  2, which is a 
fascinating  but extremely troubling  figure.  According  to the economic 
theory taught  by teachers of open economies, the little squares  should 
all be along  the zero line. Yet manifestly  they are  not. Lumber  and  furni- 
ture is up above 35 percent, paper  and allied  products  are over 15 per- 
cent, and so forth. 
What is going on? Does this reflect aggregation  bias? If so, Rangan 
and Lawrence  should  redo their  study  at a lower level of aggregation.  It 
is very likely that some of the observations  do reflect  aggregation  bias. 
For example, in lumber  and furniture,  my guess is that most of the ex- 
ports are lumber,  and much of the domestic sales is furniture.  Perhaps 
there is also significant  aggregation  bias in paper  and allied  products  as 
well. 
To the extent that the results in figure  2 do not reflect aggregation 
bias, they suggest  that  commodity  arbitrage  is more  difficult  in the short 
run than economists typically assume. The short run here-keep  in 
mind-is  three  to four years, the timeframe  that  is relevant  for business 
cycle analysis. 
In open economy macroeconomics,  one of the unquestioned  prem- 
ises is the law of one price, such that the same commodity-after 
allowing  for transfer  costs-sells  at the same price in all markets  when 
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question  the law of one price. To the extent that  it is not aggregation  bias 
that is showing  up here, but rather  the difficulties,  for many legal and 
practical  reasons, of international  arbitrage,  these findings  suggest that 
we have to review  one of the basic  premises  of macroeconomic  analysis. 
General Discussion 
Several  panel members  focused on differences  between the behavior 
of U.S. and  foreign  firms.  Robert  Hall reported  Michael  Knetter's  find- 
ings  on German  and  Japanese  auto  makers.  Even though  Knetter's  price 
data reflected intrafirm  transactions-like  the data in the Rangan- 
Lawrence  paper-Knetter found that these firms  priced  to market,  un- 
like the evidence for the transportation  industry  in figure  2 of the paper. 
Martin  Baily suggested  that  large  Japanese  firms  may be able to price to 
market  more  easily than  U.S. firms  because large  Japanese  firms  have a 
sizable productivity  advantage  over other firms  in their industry, and 
can therefore  absorb  rises in the exchange rate and still make a profit. 
Baily  also suggested  that  smaller  firms  are  often subsidiary  to large  Japa- 
nese firms  and in competition  with foreign suppliers, so that the large 
firms  can often extract  price concessions from  them  when the exchange 
rate rises. Greg  Mankiw  asked whether  the use of the dollar  as a unit of 
account  for purchases  of intermediate  inputs  could provide  an explana- 
tion  for differences  in pricing  behavior.  Rangan  replied  that  this denomi- 
nation  effect is unlikely  to distinguish  U.S. multinationals  from  foreign 
exporters.  In  particular,  foreign  costs account  for 80 percent  of the value 
added  of sales by foreign  affiliates  of U.S. multinationals,  so that these 
affiliates  would  be subject  to the same denomination  effect that  Mankiw 
described. 
The panel also focused on the data problems  that Rangan  and Law- 
rence described.  Peter  Hooper  noted that  a puzzle emerges  if the export 
price  data  erroneously  fail to reflect  pricing-to-market  behavior  by U.S. 
exporters  for the reasons  Rangan  and  Lawrence  suggest.  This measure- 
ment  error  implies  that  the variability  of the BLS export  price  data  (mea- 
sured in foreign currencies) is artificially  inflated by fluctuations in 
exchange rates, leading to an underestimation  of the elasticity of de- 
mand  for U.S. exports. But this elasticity is generally  estimated to be 
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gan and Lawrence are correct about measurement  error  in the export 
data, U.S. exports, in fact, could  be significantly  more  price-elastic  than 
U.S. imports.  This is a puzzle because there is no particular  reason, a 
priori,  to believe the price elasticity of exports exceeds that  of imports. 
Lawrence  replied  that the export price data are not subject  to classical 
measurement  error,  but  rather  that  the published  export  prices  are  pick- 
ing up the prices relevant  for sourcing  decisions rather  than the prices 
relevant  to the decisions of final  consumers.  Thought  of in these terms, 
Lawrence  saw no puzzle in the estimated  price  elasticities. 
Some members  of the panel asked to what extent the data on U.S. 
imports  are subject  to the same biases as the export price data. Rangan 
replied  that this is not likely to be the case for two reasons. First, the 
BLS collects its data  on import  prices from U.S. importers,  not foreign 
exporters.  Second, there is evidence that intrafirm  trade  is notably  less 
significant  for foreign  firms  than  for U.S. firms. 
Andrei  Shleifer  asked what theoretical  basis existed for the premise 
that prices charged  to foreign  affiliates  should not change  when the ex- 
change rate changes. Lawrence responded  that a multinational  parent 
selling  to its foreign  subsidiary  would  just use the U.S. cost as its price  in 
order  to provide  subsidiaries  with  accurate  cost information  for sourcing 
decisions. Finally,  Peter  Hooper  noted  a testable  implication  of the idea 
that exchange rates were important  in sourcing  decisions. If they were 
important,  then exchange rate movements  should  cause fluctuations  in 
the market  share  and  profits  of U.S. resident  firms. Subramanian Rangan  and Robert Z. Lawrence  377 
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